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DRAFT MEMORANDUM

*received from
Representative of Department of State*

December 4, 1951

Subject: CIA/OPC Strategic Plan

The CIA/OPC Strategic Plan might well be shortened and simplified by the omission of certain sections which are based on existing NSC papers and National Intelligence Estimates. Experience shows that attempts to go over the ground covered in existing policy papers and situation analyses involves either repetition, or, if the language of existing papers is departed from, to a burdensome and protracted drafting process. Moreover, there is a tendency to regard such statements as a manual which constitutes the final word so far as the proposed programs, to which the statements are introductory, are concerned. Furthermore, it is felt that a paper such as this is not the proper vehicle for any deviation in substance from approved policy decisions and intelligence estimates. There might be substituted a brief statement that the Plan is based on and is believed to be consonant with the policy determinations of the National Security Council, and upon existing National Intelligence Estimates; and if necessary reference can be made to specific NSC papers and National Intelligence Estimates. The statement might conclude to the effect that all plans, programs and projects will be kept under constant review in order to keep them in accord with the development of policy and with such changes in the situation as may be revealed by new National Intelligence Estimates. Thus, Part II, Section II, Situation; Part II, Section III, National Policy and Strategic Concepts; Part II, Annex A, U.S. Policy with respect to Western Europe, and Annex B, Section III, would be omitted in their entirety.

(revised in accordance with above)

The following detailed comments are not intended to be exhaustive:

Part I. It is suggested that on Page 1, Part I, six lines from the bottom, the words "in the absence" be substituted for "before any initiation", in order to conform to similar phraseology in the first sentence of Part II, Section I.

(revised)

In Part II,

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✓ In Part II, Section IV, B, 1, Page 1, the first sentence seems to make a distinction which does not involve a genuine contrast, since weakening the Stalin regime by covert operations is also in order to prevent aggression.

(revised)

✓ In Part II, Section IV, B, 3, Page 1, the clause beginning "since" does not adequately explain the concept mentioned in the first part of the sentence.

(revised)

✓ In Part II, Section IV, C, 3, Page 2, add the following sentences: "The word 'objective' is here used in the political as well as the military sense, i.e., as including intangible aims, such as affecting the attitudes of certain groups, and affecting political trends. When used in the political sense, it is understood that an objective may never be wholly attained and may continuously be in the process of attainment".

(incorporated)

✓ Part II, Section V, C, Pages 2-4. It is understood that this portion of the paper will be clarified to indicate that, and, in a general way, how operations in support of the Cold War Plan, the Emergency Transition Plan and the Emergency War Plan are included within each of the three priorities listed.

(Section 2 has been revised and approved after 10/2/54)

✓ In Part II, Section V, C, 2, Page 3, East Germany should be added to the areas listed; and areas within the Soviet Union which should be included are not limited to the Caucasus and Central Asia. In the following paragraph "West" should be inserted before "Germany". The phraseology of Priority Two on this page should be clarified to show that the word "defense" is used to include political, economic and social factors as well as military.

✓ In Part II, Section V, C, 3, Page 4, it is not clear why Priorities Three and Two of Phase II are not in the order of Priorities Two and Three of Phase I, and why Priority Three of Phase II is not stated in the same terms as Priority Two of Phase I.

Part II, Section VI, B, Page 3, particularly subparagraph a., is too general. For example, it would seem that mention should be made here, under C, Important Tasks, or in Annex B on Psychological Warfare, with appropriate cross references, of covert propaganda directed toward eliminating the proportional representation system of voting

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which greatly favors the Communists, toward the elimination of restrictive trade practices, of Communist control in labor unions, towards more far-sighted production and labor practices by industry, land reform, tax reform, and against all the unhealthy economic, political and social practices which make the Western European body politic, apart from the U.K., so laggard and uncertain in realizing the potentials which might tip the scales of the cold war decisively against the Soviet Union.

(Annex B is being reviewed in light of the above)

In Part II, Section VI, C, 1, d, (1), Page 9, it is not clear why only Germany, Sweden and Italy in Western Europe are mentioned, if by "cold war operations" is meant "operations in support of the Cold War Plan". This would seem to be inconsistent with Priority Two of Phase I, as described on Page 3 of Part II, Section V.

(this provides for support bases, not operational bases)

With respect to Part II, Section VI, C, 12, Page 11, it is likely that a propaganda campaign to this end directed at NATO members would tend to be self-defeating.

(under consideration)

The Phasing Guidance, in Part II, Section VI, D, Page 11, would seem to be oversanguine as to the rate at which so comprehensive and complex a set of plans can be carried out. There would also seem to be some danger in the explicit emphasis on speed without equal explicit emphasis on the overriding necessity in covert operations of thoroughness of preparation, even at the sacrifice of speed.

(Section VI, D is general guidance and will be limited as capabilities develop)

There is attached hereto a copy of a memorandum commenting on Annex B.

In conclusion it is noted that Parts III and IV have not been made available to the Department for comment on such aspects of the Emergency Transition Plan and the Emergency War Plan as may be relevant to the Department's responsibilities. It is understood that when the Strategic Plan is presented in full detail to the Psychological Strategy Board the Department will have a further opportunity to offer comments.

Attachment

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